CO129-548-15 Sand Ordinance 1934 23-11-1934 - 12-9-1935 — Page 4

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But I agree with Mr. Roberts-Wray that

the Governor or the Attorney-General should

properly have given some explanation of Clause 7(3)

in relation to the circular despatch, and I suggest

that in sanctioning the Ordinance we should draw

attention to the desirability of this being done.

in any future case, and add that the Secretary of

State assumes that the prosecution will itself be

under the onus of proving the point mentioned above

at A.

Sallent.

23.1.35.

means

As I read the Circular despatch, it seems

that all legislation placing the onus of proof on the

accused in the case of unlawful possession of goods

is open to objection, and that though it is a necessary

evil in the case of predial larceny, no legislation

of this kind, whatever its purpose, should be intro-

duced unless it is first submitted in draft with a

full explanation. I agree with the construction

suggested by Mr. Gent at "A" in his minute, but I very

much doubt whether this is intended, since Section

7(3) is no doubt designed to save trouble for the

prosecution, and it would presumably be anything but

an easy matter to prove that a quantity of sand found,

say, in a man's home was sand as defined in the

Ordinance. I still think, moreover, that the

Section should be limited to cases where there is

reasonable suspicion that the sand was unlawfully

obtained, and that the Governor should be asked to

consider